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The Future of ADR
Edward A. Dauer
Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law
University of Denver
ADR in health care has a long way to go, a lot to do, and a past to live
down.
A comprehensive survey of the use of ADR in health care was under-
taken in 19901 and selectively updated in 1997.2 The results on both occa-
sions were surprising: ADR has been less frequently employed in health care
than the situation in that field would warrant. There was certainly an in-
creased usage between the dates of the two surveys, and there has been fur-
ther evidence of its acceptance since the latter of the two;3 but it seems still
to be the case that health care has come to ADR cautiously at best.
Without knowing these data, one might have predicted quite the contrary.
Health care is undergoing rapid and often wrenching change. From an eco-
nomic microsystem in which the major flaws were over-consumption and an
absence of competition, it has become, in only about a decade, nearly the op-
posite of what it used to be. Health care is now a highly competitive environ-
ment structured to achieve economies while delivering efficient levels of ser-
vice.4 Providers, who once earned more by doing more, may now earn more
by doing less. Comfortable arrangements among suppliers and payors that
once abounded are being undone as payors reduce costs to compete for the
business of the larger employers. Physicians compete for appointments within
groups and plans, and payors compete to attract profitable providers. The
alignments among patients, providers, payors and employers have changed in
ways that would not have been recognizable less than a generation ago.
Change creates conflicts, since conflicts so often arise from unmet ex-
pectations, about advantage, status, and place. The 1990 CPR survey identi-
1. The 1990 study was conducted by the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution. with the
support of a grant from the Kellogg Foundation. The author of this part of this article served as
chair of that effort. The results of the CPR work appear in E. A. Dauer et al. Health Industry
Dispute Resolution: Strategies and Tools for Cost-Effective Dispute Management (CPR 1993).
2. The 1997 update was also conducted by the present author, with the support of a grant
from the Robert Wood Johnson IMPACS program. The results of that work have not ben pub-
lished apart from a report to the Foundation.
3. See e.g. E. Rolph et al, Arbitration Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Realiy, 60
L. & Contemp. Prob. 153 (1997)
4. See generally Clark Havighurst et al., Health Care Law and Policy (2-d Ed. 1998).
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fled more than 50 kinds of disputes in which health care entities were en-
gaged, 5 many of them being unique to that field. Physicians, for example,
have conflicts with health plans over matters of inclusion and deselection; pa-
tients have conflicts with physicians about access, quality and service; pa-
tients dispute with insurers over benefits and coverage. There are, among
many others, reimbursement disputes between payors and providers, and qual-
ity-focused conflicts between providers and their regulatory agencies. All of
these occur in addition to the more common problems that arise in the normal
lives of contracting and employment, supply and competition, and such other
activities as any business or profession encounters.
The disputes are happening, yet (with the exception of court-annexed
procedures) there has been less use of ADR in these disputes than experience
elsewhere would suggest. It is a mystery why this is so. Perhaps health care
managers and professionals, linked as they are to the empirical traditions of
the health sciences, have been waiting for sufficient data about ADR's suc-
cesses and failures before they will adopt it as a nostrum for themselves.
Maybe the changes in the industry have made the stakes too great or the new
rules of the road too unpredictable to allow for confidence in private resolu-
tions. For some new problems authoritative intervention may be required,
which ADR does not provide. In one particular area the 1997 investigation
found that at least some of the resistance to ADR came from the insurance
industry, which is not only the principal stakeholder in health care but is also
an industry whose conservatism is in many ways demonstrable, though not al-
together inappropriate. 6
The usage rate of ADR in medical malpractice remains depressed, 7 de-
spite some notable private initiatives. 8 Here, however, the gap between need
and usage is more readily understood. ADR in medical malpractice had a bad
false start, the effects of which have been discernible for over a decade.
5. There are others that were not identified by the CPR surveys, such as end-of-life
decisions.
6. Not all insurers fit this description. Some, such as CIGNA and the COPIC companies,
have long been at the forefront of developments in ADR. But many are reluctant to change what
has been successful for them. For further discussion see E. Dauer et al., Prometheus and the Liti-
gators: A Mediation Odyssey, in 21 J. Legal Med. 159 (2000).
7. A private survey was conducted by the Physician Insurers' Association of America in
1999, which measured the usage rate of mediation among its member companies. The results
showed only a modest use of mediation in malpractice disputes; and, where mediation was em-
ployed, its use by medical liability insurers is most often at a very late stage in the management
of a claim. The PIAA study is on file with the author.
8. One example is the program at Rush-Presbyterian Hospital in Chicago, described in R.
Gitchel et al., Mediation: A Viable Alternative to Litigation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 2 De
Paul J. Health Care L. 421 at 447 (1999).
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There were two periods in recent history that were known as the "insur-
ance crises." In 1974-75 and again in 1985-86, liability insurance became ex-
pensive and in some sectors virtually unavailable. The disruptions that caused
were highly visible. The news media were full of stories such as those of ru-
ral physicians who refused to deliver babies because their malpractice carriers
would not cover the liability risks. The crisis was not limited to health care,
but some in health care were poised to seize on it, describing the insurance
crisis as the consequence of a legal system gone awry.9 It may or may not
have been the case that the liability system was in need of reform,t0 but that
is exactly what it got. Those same years were the peaks of legislative efforts
in tort reform. A good deal of the statutory changes in tort law that occurred
in the past generation were put in place during those two brief periods of
time.
Many of the tort reforms of 1974-75 and 1985-86 were directed at mal-
practice liability in particular. Much of the rest of it affected malpractice lia-
bility along with everything else. Caps on pain and suffering, for example,
were widely enacted, along with repeal of the collateral benefits rules. Some
of the reformers' initiatives, however, were just too far a departure to be po-
litically viable. Efforts to impose caps on plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and other
devices such as fee-shifting, which would have created disincentives for
plaintiffs to bring their claims to court, were successfully resisted. Thus ADR
was widely introduced as part of the entire reform package. It was not intro-
duced, however, to achieve better resolutions, as the cognoscenti of the field
would have preferred. It was embraced instead as an alternative way to limit
access to the courts - a goal the reformers were unable to accomplish
through substantive legal changes alone. About half the states enacted devices
known as "screening panels." Others adopted mandatory pre-trial mediation;
some tried mandatory (albeit non-binding) arbitration. All of these were
9. It was the case that the severity of medical malpractice claims had grown rapidly in the
decades just before. For a contemporary discussion of the tort reform agenda during the second
"insurance crisis," see generally Symposium, 64 Den. U. L Rev. 613 (1987).
10. There is reason to believe that the two insurance crises were the result of endogenous
features of the insurance industry rather than of any changes in the legal environment. For nearly
fifty years, insurance prices and insurance availability had shown a cyclical pattern with a period
of almost exactly eleven years, thus peaking in 74-75 and again in 85-86. Unpublished research
on file with the author, who served as Chair of the Colorado Tort Reform Commission during the
1985-86 cycle.
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meant to serve as barriers, or at least as diversions away from the courthouse
itself.
Predictably perhaps, none of this worked very well. Screening panels
have been a failure almost everywhere they were tried." Mandatory mediation
became a side-bar form of settlement conference negotiation. Mandatory arbi-
tration in some states actually added a layer of expense without achieving ei-
ther the efficiencies or the diversions its proponents expected.
The reasons for these failures are not hard to understand. ADR works
well when it is used for what it is designed to do: to improve the manage-
ment of conflicts and achieve better outcomes, not to serve as a surrogate for
politically unsaleable substantive change. Lawyers dislike being told what to
do. Mandatory procedures operating on an institution's sense of the calendar
do not command much support, and court-based reforms that address matters
only after they have become lawsuits do not prevent lawsuits. Perhaps most
important is the now well-known fact that in ADR there is no such thing as
"once-size-fits-all." The characteristics of cases that make them appropriate
matters for one form of resolution rather than another are complex and not
limited to the legal label that may be placed on the claim. Many of the ADR
procedures grafted onto the tort reform initiatives recognized little if any of
these finer points. The results were neither what was expected, nor what they
otherwise could have been.
The consequences of the tort-reform misadventure have had a long per-
sistence. In medical injury in particular, ADR got a bad name. Not many
people fully appreciated the differences between well-crafted private media-
tion and the court-annexed haggling that became known as mediation. Even
today the phrase "mediation" conjures in the minds of liability insurers an
image of a facilitated settlement conference with its single-axis focus on dol-
lars alone - a procedure most often employed only after the decision to pay
has been made, leaving for resolution only the question of how much.
It was a bad start. Whether the failed experiment in malpractice also af-
fected the reputation of ADR in other areas of health care cannot be as easily
determined. Two things, however, are certain. First, this false start did retard
the applications of ADR in one important and very visible part of health care;
and second, the rest of health care is behind where it should be on the ADR
usage curve. Health care underutilizes ADR, and ADR has a long way to go
in health care.
11. See e.g. Jona Goldschmidt, Where Have All the Panels Gone? : A History of the Ari-
zona Medical Liability Review Panel, 23 Ariz. St. L. J. 1013 (1992).
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There is a certain irony in this situation. In health care in particular,
ADR may be able to contribute a great deal, some of it qualitatively different
from what it has been able to accomplish elsewhere. This unusual potential is
in fact the more interesting of the challenges ADR faces as it moves into the
new millennium.
The benefits ADR can bring to health care disputes are at first glance
not very different from those that appear elsewhere: economy in dispute man-
agement, reduction of adversariness, streamlining of the otherwise ponderous
processes of the courts. Another benefit, when ADR is used preventively, is
its potential to prevent disputes from becoming lawsuits at all. A problem can
remain a problem, capable of being solved as such rather than maturing into
a lawsuit that allows solutions crafted only from the limited argot of that
genre. I believe, however, that the potential for ADR in health care is far
greater than that. I will focus again on the malpractice setting, though I be-
lieve similar descriptions could be offered for benefits disputes, physician
deselection conflicts, and many others.
Briefly, we now know that there is little if any correlation between in-
cremental liability for medical accidents and incremental patient safety. Con-
ventional analysis predicts that if doctors pay more when they make mistakes,
they will be less likely to make mistakes. In fact, it doesn't seem to work that
way.' 2 More deterrence seems not to follow from the imposition of more lia-
bility. Along with Marcus, Passineau, Thomasson and others, I have been
pondering this phenomenon, and have developed the hypothesis that the pro-
cess by which medical liability is imposed may be the culprit. That process
is, conventionally, litigation and its associated procedures.
As Passineau has shown, physicians who have been sued for a medical
error are more likely to make another error during the pendency of that suit,
rather than less.13 Why is this so? Leape14 and others have described what
needs to be done to help an error-producing system improve. Almost all of
what ought to happen in error-reduction is inconsistent with almost all of
12. The most recent study that searched for and found no effect of incremental liability on
incremental patient safety is Douglas Conrad et al.. The Incentive Effects of Malpractice Liability
Rules on Physician Behavior, 36 Med. Care 706 (1998)
1-3. See Passineau, Why Burned-Out Doctors Get Sued More Often, Med. Econ. 1998:
Thomasson, "Patient Safety Implications of Medical Malpractice Claims Resolution Procedures,"
in Enhancing Patient Safety and Reducing Errors in Health Care (AAAS 1998).
14. Lucian Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA1851 (1994)
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what happens in traditional litigation. For example, error-reduction requires
that errors be addressed as the outputs of systems. Litigation, by contrast, fo-
cuses on the isolated activities of individuals. Error reduction requires full in-
formation about the instances and causes of errors. The risks of creating ad-
verse evidence for litigation, however, tend to push information further
underground. Error reduction requires a non-punitive environment, within
which accidents can be approached as learning opportunities. Medical liability
litigation is nothing if it is not punitive.
There is good reason to believe that well-crafted forms of mediation can
achieve an effective link between today's medical error and tomorrow's pa-
tient safety. Mediation, for example, offers the re-establishment of communi-
cation within which expectations, flaws, and the causes of accidents can be
explored. Mediation's flexible outcomes allow for corrective rather than puni-
tive solutions. Confidentiality in mediation can allow for a much less-risky
root cause analysis. All of this is in addition to the fact that mediation can in
many cases respond more authentically to the needs of injured patients and
their families, whom we know want rectitude, correction, and closure (and,
yes, sometimes revenge) more frequently than they want cash. 15
The details of all this are extensive and worth being explored more fully.
The present point is only that the future of ADR in health care may well in-
clude, if participants in the field will help it include, a contribution to reduc-
ing future medical accidents. This may not be a familiar assignment for ADR,
but it is an opportunity to achieve an important health care objective. Al-
though we have not yet explored the same theme in other areas within health
care, it seems at first glance to be a real possibility. Disputes about benefits,
for example, can be opportunities for physicians to understand more about
their patients, and patients to understand more deeply the whys and the ways
of medical care. Better health is often the result. Adversarial conflict tech-
niques destroy communication. ADR techniques help repair it.
Ever the optimist, I suspect we may be able to make lemonade from the
lemons with which ADR in health care began. Providers, their insurers, and
many health care managers have not fully embraced ADR, remaining uncon-
vinced perhaps by its more conventional promises. If we can develop empiri-
cal demonstrations that ADR techniques may have these more far-reaching
consequences, perhaps its use can be fostered explicitly on those grounds. It
will be close work, and must be done with the rigor and care that health care
prides itself as fostering. The results will not come ovemight, but the effort
15. See e.g. Penchansky and Macnee, Initiation of Medical Malpractice Suits, 32 Med
Care 813. (1994). G. Hickson et al. Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359 (1992).
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seems worthwhile. There is not much downside, and the opportunities on the
upside are useful, important, and tantalizing indeed.
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